Infinity Air, Inc. v. Echo Global Logistics, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00307-MO (U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, June 20, 2013). Court-issued opinion available here.
Note Court’s analysis in its Footnote 1 of plaintiff’s argument that a “broker” can be a “motor carrier” through the plaintiff’s tortured reading of the definition of “transportation” per § 13102(23)(B)’s definition of “transportation”, i.e., that “transportation” extends to the mere “arranging for [movement of] … property” – therefore by that logic a “broker” is also a “motor carrier”:
“The definition of ‘transportation’ does not alter my analysis. Section 13102(23)(B) states that ‘transportation’ includes ‘services related to [the] movement [of passengers or property], including arranging for, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, ventilation, handling, packing, unpacking, and interchange of passengers and property.’ If the definition of ‘motor carrier’ incorporated the definition of ‘transportation’ and extended to any person ‘arranging for [the movement of] . . . property,’ brokers would cease to exist under the Act. I decline to read the definition of ‘motor carrier’ in a way that renders the definition of ‘broker’ meaningless. Applying the canon of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, I interpret the general term ‘arranging for’ to be similar to the other specific terms in the series, which all relate to the conduct of the actual transporter. Because Echo did not ‘arrange for’ the movement of property in this more limited sense, it is a broker rather than a motor carrier under the Act.”